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Owen v. City of Independence:
Municipal Liability, An Evolving Trend
Two decades ago, local governments were only marginally exposed to liability in an action for damages brought under section

1983 of the Civil Rights Act.1 The prevailing authority at that time

was Monroe v. Pape,' which held that municipalities were not
"persons" within the ambit of section 1983. In the past three years,

however, the Supreme Court has substantially extended the scope

of section 1983 with regard to municipal defendants. This extension is evidenced by the determination that municipalities are

"persons" to which section 1983 applies, s and by the denial of a

"good faith" defense in the recent case of Owen v. City of Independence.4 Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of
New York 5 marked the turning point in a municipality's exposure
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) in relevant part reads:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeeding for redress.
Section 1983 was originally enacted as Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
In 1871, the states possessed the majority of the governmental power and were
largely responsible for the protection of civil rights. Note, Theories of Federalisms and Civil Rights, 75 YAE L.J. 1007, 1018-20 (1966). The Civil Rights Act of
1871 was enacted primarily to deal with the refusal of local government officials in
the South to suppress the Ku Klux Klan. See Developments in the Law: Section
1983 and Federalism,90 HAxv. L. Rzv. 1133, 1154 (1977) [hereinafter referred to
as Developments]; Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning
of "Policy or Custom", 79 COLUM. L. REv. 304, 308 (1979).
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Plaintiff and his family were forced out of bed in the
middle of the night and forced to stand naked while police officers searched their
home without a warrant. Monroe was then taken to the police station, interrogated for ten hours and finally released without being charged. Monroe brought a
Section 1983 action against thirteen police officers and the City of Chicago for
violating his fourth amendment rights under color of state law.
3. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4. - U.S. -, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980).
5. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Petitioners, female employees of the Board of Education and the Department of Social Services of the City of New York, brought this
action against respondents for adopting the official policy of a mandatory leave of
absence for pregnant employees before such leave was necessary for medical
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to liability under section 1983. In Monell, the Court reassessed the
position, taken in Monroe v. Pape, that Congress had not intended state political subdivisions to be included within the meaning of "persons" in section 1983. The Court reversed this position
in Monell and held that under section 1983 the term "persons"
was meant to include state political subdivisions. The Court held,
in Owen, that municipalities are not entitled to a qualified immunity against section 1983 damage actions predicated on the good
faith acts of their officials.
The Owen decision is significant for the liability it creates as
well as the trend it continues. In addition, Owen attempts to answer some of the questions which Monell left unresolved. The
Court determined that Congress did not intend to silently incorporate a qualified immunity for municipalities into section 1983 because at common law this good faith immunity was not clearly established. The Court further concluded that public policy
considerations also favored holding local governments liable in section 1983 actions despite the good faith acts of their officials. This
note will examine the Owen decision and its continuation of the
trend which Monell began. Monell was the seminal decision in a
now apparent trend of expanding the scope of section 1983 actions
to promote the protection and redress of individual plaintiffs'
injuries.
On February 20, 1967, George D. Owen was appointed to an
indefinite term as police chief of the City of Independence, Missouri. Owen had no employment contract, but was subject to rereasons.

6. In the wake of Monroe, the Court restricted further the availability of section 1983 actions. The Court used three methods for restricting the employment
of section 1983: 1) a restrictive view of the "persons" suable under section 1983; 2)
development of a particular state of mind requirement; and 3) limiting the relief
available once liability had been proven. Developments, supra note 1, at 1191.
See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972) (Court refused to question
or qualify the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that serve to restrain a
federal court from enjoining a state court proceeding); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S.
362, 379-80 (1976) (Court ruled that the district court had exceeded its legal powers under section 1983 by becoming too involved in the administration of a local
police department through the purported employment of its equity powers).
7. The four major questions left open in Monell are: 1) What constitutes official policy and who are official policymakers? 2) What is the scope of custom and
usage? 3) What level of conduct is necessary on the part of defendant to trigger a
section 1983 action? 4) is a qualified immunity available to local governments?
See generally, Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L.
REv. 213 (1979).
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moval at the sole behest of the city manager "when deemed necessary for the good of the service." In 1972, a conflict arose between
Owen and City Manager Alberg concerning the administration of
the police department, particularly Owen's supervision of the property room.9 On April 10, 1972, Alberg communicated to Owen his
dissatisfaction with Owen's administration of the police department and asked Owen to resign as police chief. Despite Owen's refusal, Alberg apparently decided on April 15, 1972, to replace
Owen as chief of police with Lieutenant Lawrence L. Cook of the
police department, but did not immediately inform anyone of his
decision.' 0
At a city council meeting on April 17, 1972, Councilman Roberts read a statement which, in conjunction with Owen's dismissal
the following day, produced the injury in this action." The next
8. CITY OF INDEPENDENCE, MO., CHARTER § 3.3 (1).

9. A handgun which was reported as being in the police department's custody
was later found in the possession of a felon. Narcotics and money was alleged to
have mysteriously disappeared from police department custody. Alberg therefore
instituted an investigation of the property department in mid-March of 1972. The
investigation was handled by the City Counselor who reported to Alberg on or
before April 12, 1972, that there was no evidence of any criminal acts nor was
there any evidence of violation of state or local statutes in the administration of
the police department. The auditor, however, reported that there were insufficient
police records to make an accurate audit of the contents of the property room. 560
F.2d 925, 928 (5th Cir. 1977).
U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1403. While Alberg was out of town on
10. the weekend of the 15th and 16th of April, 1972, Assistant City Manager Parley
Banks, acting as city manager in Alberg's absence, issued the property room investigation reports to Councilman Paul L. Roberts at Roberts' request. Roberts
read the reports and, believing that the contents should be made public, drafted a
statement to be read by him at the next city council meeting on April 17, 1972,
without prior notice to anyone. In a letter dated April 15, 1972, Owen requested
that Alberg furnish him with reasons for his termination and a hearing. Id. Alberg, however, testified that he did not receive the letter until after the discharge
was implemented. This demand by Owen was ignored by the city. The city denied
a subsequent request for an appeal of the discharge by Owen's attorney, stating
that the city charter did not provide for an appellate forum or procedure in the
case of the discharge of an administrative official such as Owen. Id. at 1405.
11. The statement is reproduced in full at 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1116 n.2 (W.D.
Mo. 1976). In the statement, Roberts alleged that Owen had diverted police department property to his own use, that money and narcotics had disappeared
from Owen's office, that traffic tickets were manipulated, that "things have occurred causing the unusual release of felons", and that "the reports show gross
inefficiencies on the part of a few high ranking officers of the police department."
The city council also passed Roberts' motion that the reports be turned over to
the prosecutor for immediate action against those persons "involved in illegal,
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day, Owen was discharged for reasons undisclosed to him. Both
Roberts' statement at the council meeting and Owen's discharge
were given extensive coverage by the media.1 2
LOWER COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner originally brought his claim in the district court
against the city manager, the mayor, the members of the city council in their official capacity, and the city itself."3 The Monroe decision prevented an action against the city under section 1983,14 and
although the district court allowed an action to be maintained
against the city arising directly under the fourteenth amendment,"
the court dismissed this claim on the merits. The court rejected
Owen's claim of a property interest in his employment at the outset.'" The court also rejected Owen's claim of deprivation of a libwrongful, or grossly inefficient activities brought out by the investigative reports."
12.

-

U.S. at

-

, 100 S. Ct. at 1404 n.8.

13. Owen v. City of Independence, 421 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mo. 1976).
14. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961).
15. The general federal question statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which requires
the jurisdictional amount of $10,000.
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States, except that no such sum or value shall be
required in any such action brought against the United States, any
agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
An action on this theory was made possible by the Supreniie Court's decision in
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens held that a federal court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a suit (a test which all section 1983 actions, by definition, would meet
under section 1331) may grant any traditional judicial remedy which is "necessary" or "appropriate" to the vindication of rights arising from positive law. The
fourteenth amendment is clearly such a positive law. In bringing an action directly under the fourteenth amendment, plaintiffs must proceed under section
1331 since courts have refused to allow the use of section 1343(3) (which gives
district courts original jurisdiction over any action brought to redress the deprivation of a right guaranteed by any state or federal law providing for equal rights)
to secure jurisdiction unless the basis for the suit is a section 1983 action. This is
because section 1983 and section 1343(3) were originally part of the same statute,
the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and were only separated for the convenience of codification in 1874. See Patterson v. City of Chester, 389 F. Supp. 1093, 1095 n.1
(E.D. Pa. 1975). Under this theory, the plaintiff must therefore meet the jurisdictional amount of $10,000. The district court, in this case, found that Owen satisfied this requirement.
16. 421 F. Supp. at 1120-21.

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
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erty interest. This deprivation was alleged to have resulted from
the stigma that the public attached to him when he was discharged
after the councilman's defamatory statements.1 7 After refusing to
recognize any interest set forth by Owen, the court discussed the
viability of a good faith defense by the city and concluded that the
city would be entitled to such a defense. s
Owen appealed the denial of his claim, and the city cross-appealed."9 In the first of the decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the court affirmed Owen's right to
bring a claim against the city arising directly under the fourteenth
amendment 0 and accepted Owen's claim on the merits under his
claim was upheld
deprivation of liberty interest theory.' Owen's
2
against the defendant's good faith defense.'
Shortly after the city was granted certiorari, the Supreme
Court ruled in Monell that a municipality was a "person" within
The case was then remanded to be
the meaning of section 1983."3
4
decided in light of Mone1.2
The court of appeals, on remand, found that Owen's deprivation of liberty was caused by the city lawmakers' official conduct. 25
was not
The court also held, in a cursory manner, that the city
6
entitled to a good faith defense against Owen's claim.'
ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT OPINION

Since the city failed to cross-petition on the issue of Owen's
liberty interest, the majority refused to disturb the court of appeals' ruling that Owen was deprived of a liberty interest guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment .' The Court then examined
17. Id. at 1117.

18. Id. at 1124.
19. The cross-appeal challenged the district court's finding that the city and
individual defendants were amenable to suit directly under the fourteenth
amendment by use of section 1331.
20. Owen v. City of Independence, 560 F.2d 925, 933-34 (8th Cir. 1977).
21. Id. at 935.
22. Id. at 940.

23. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
24. Owen v. City of Independence, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
25. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1978).
26. Id. at 339.
27. - U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1406 n.13. The majority set forth the
basis for the constitutional violation. "The Council's accusations received extensive coverage in the press, and even if they did not in point of fact 'cause' petitioner's discharge, the defamatory and stigmatizing charges certainly 'occur[red]
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whether Congress intended to silently incorporate a qualified immunity for local governments into section 1983 and resolved the

issue in the negative. The Court next surveyed the public policy
considerations which bear on the question of immunity and found
that public policy is best served by holding municipalities liable
notwithstanding the good faith acts of the public officials involved.
The Court clearly resolved one of the four major questions left
open in Monell (whether a municipality should be afforded a quali-

fied immunity defense) and at least narrowed, if not resolved, an-

other (the question of the level of conduct necessary for a munici-

pality to be held liable in a section 1983 action).
To determine whether a muncipality should enjoy a qualified
immunity, the Court began with a discussion of statutory construction. The fact that the statute "on its face admits of no immunities," the Court determined, was not conclusive proof that a quali-

fied immunity for municipalities had not been silently
incorporated into section 1983. Previous decisions of the Court had
established that both absolute 8 and qualified 2 immunities for cer-

in the course of the termination of employment.'" (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693, 710 (1976)). The dissent took issue with this determination, stating that
only the actual discharge should be examined, i.e., City Manager Alberg's statements and conduct. The only public statements Alberg made concerning Owen's
discharge exonerated Owen from any criminal conduct. 421 F. Supp. at 1114. The
dissent was unwilling to accept a causal connection between the statements at the
city council meeting on April 17, 1972, and Owen's discharge the following day.
The causal connection, however, was in the recounting of events by the local
newspapers. 421 F. Supp. at 1116.
28. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (8 U.S.C. §§ 43 and
47(3) did not abrogate the absolute immunity that legislators possess for acts
within the sphere of legislative activity); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554-55
(1967) (absolute immunity preserved for judge's acts within their judicial jurisdiction); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421-25 (1976) (prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity for initiating and prosecuting the state's case).
29. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967) (police officers entitled to
"good faith and probable cause" defense under section 1983
actions); Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (Governor and other state executive officials
enjoyed a qualified immunity that varied with "the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office"); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975) (local
school board members are immune from suit under section 1983 provided they act
in good faith in the exercise of their official duties). Wood also set out a two-step
test for bad faith containing both a subjective and objective analysis, both of
which an official must pass to be free from bad faith. Either acting with a malicious intent to cause a deprivation (subjective), or acting in such disregard of an
individual's clearly established constitutional rights (objective), will establish bad
faith.
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tain officials were impliedly incorporated into section 1983. This
implied incorporation of immunity was based on 1) the commonlaw rule of immunity being well settled at the time section 1983
was enacted, and 2) the policy reasons for the common law immunity also being supportive of its incorporation into section 1983.80
At common law, municipalities were sued in federal and state
court in a variety of contexts and were generally considered, in the
absence of one of the immunities discussed below, to owe the same
legal duties to private individuals as other individuals or private

corporations owed.3 ' In 1871, the contract clause was the provision

of the Federal Constitution most commonly enforced against mu-

nicipalities.38 Federal statutory violations by municipalities were
also regularly adjudicated by the courts.38 Municipalities were consistently required to pay damages for violations of state constitu-

tional and statutory prohibitions such as those proscribing the taking of property without payment of just compensation." Local
governments were liable in tort for actions taken pursuant to their
proprietary functions" as well as their governmental functions for
which sovereign immunity had been withdrawn by statute." The
30. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424.

31. 1 J. SHEARMAN & A.

REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE

§

292 (1941) [hereinafter cited as SHEARMAN & REDFIELD]; E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.02 (3d rev. ed. 1977). See generally C. RHYNE, MUNICIPAL
LAW, 729 (1957).
32. Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294, 303 (1866); Thompson v. County
of Lee, 3 Wall. 327, 330 (1866); Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575, 584 (1869).
33. Corp. of New York v. Ramson, 23 How. 487 (1860) (patent law violation);
Bliss v. Brooklyn, 3 Fed. Cases 706 (E.D.N.Y. 1871); Levy Court v. Coroner, 2
Wall. 501 (1864).
34. See Note, Streets, Change of Grade, Liability of Cities, 30 Am. ST. REP.
835, 837 (1893) (citing cases).
35. T. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 240 (1869)
[hereinafter cited as COOLEY]; BEACH, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS, § 758, at 770 (1893) [hereinafter cited as BEACH].
36. See BEACH, supra note 35,

§ 261 at 266;

SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra

note 31, § 285 (1941); Note, Liability of Cities for the Negligence and Other Misconduct of Their Officers and Agents, 30 Am. ST. REP. 376, 380-87 (1893). See,
e.g., City of Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161, 167-69 (1855); Weightman v.
Washington, 1 Black 39, 50-52 (1862).
While local governmental immunity and the eleventh amendment may have
been premised on parallel ideas, their scope, purpose, and effect are not
equivalent. Counties and municipal corporations may not avail themselves of the
eleventh amendment bar to suit in federal courts. See Mount Healthy City Board
of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n.
12 (1974); Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973); Lincoln County v.
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Owen majority considered a good faith immunity irrelevant to the
governmental-proprietary
distinction."
More fundamentally,

though, since by definition sovereign immunity exists until statutorily abolished by the sovereign, the Court found that the enact-

ment of section 1983 abrogated the use of a sovereign immunity
defense in a section 1983 action."
A municipality was also protected at common law from suits

challenging "discretionary" decisions. This protection evolved out

of a concern for the separation of the coordinate branches of government.3 9 The "discretionary function" immunity was inapplicable where the municipality's duty was absolute and imperative, 0
or specific and clearly defined." The majority in Owen held that
the Federal Constitution defines absolute and imperative duties
which a municipality has no "discretion" to violate.'2 The Court
also cited Thayer v. Boston' and eight other nineteenth century
state cases as supportive of municipal liability despite good faith
Luning, 113 U.S. 529 (1890). States, moreover, are not considered "persons"
under section 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
37. The question of whether a city's agents reasonably believed that they
were conducting themselves in conformance with the law does not derive from nor
depend upon whether the city was exercising governmental or proprietary powers
when the injury occurred.

-

U.S. at

-,

100 S. Ct. at 1413.

38. Congress is considered the sovereign in regard to violations of federal
statutes and the Federal Constitution. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56
(1976). Congress therefore has the power, which it exercised in section 1983, by
the inclusion of local governments as "persons" who can be sued under the statute, to abrogate any previously enjoyed sovereign immunity under state law.
U.S. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1414 n.30.
39. SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 31, §§ 295-96; BEACH, supra note 35,
§§ 258-60; COOLEY, supra note 35, at 253-55. See, e.g., City of Little Rock v.
Wilks, 27 Ark. 572, 577 (1872); Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black 39, 49-50
(1862).
40. See SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 31, § 308 at 747.
41. E.g., Weightman v. Washington, 1 Black 39, 50 (1862).
42.

-

U.S. at

-

, 100 S. Ct. at 1415.

43. Thayer v. Boston, 36 Mass. 511 (1837) (municipality is liable for an official's acts which are within his authority or which are later ratified by the municipal corporation). The dissent in Owen attacked the majority's reliance on Thayer
and stated that Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344, 359 (1877), "squarely repudiated
the broad holding of Thayer and limited municipal liability to acts performed in
the proprietary interest of the municipality." U.S. at
, 100 S. Ct. at
1430. While Hill v. City of Boston does distinguish Thayer on the basis of the
proprietary function of the government challenged therein, it does not thereby
diminish Thayer's validity, as the dissent's statement implies.

[1980:1411
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conduct on the part of the public officials involved." The Owen
majority concluded that since a good faith defense for municipalities did not exist at the time section 1983 was enacted, Congress
could not have intended that section 1983 silently incorporate such
a qualified immunity.
In addition to finding the congressional intent supportive of
municipal liability, the Owen court held that public policy considerations also favor holding municipalities liable despite the good
faith conduct of their officials. The Supreme Court had previously
recognized that entity liability did not raise the same concerns as
did personal liability of government officials.45 Government officials' immunity from liability for their good faith acts is based on
three rationales:
1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; 2) the danger that the
threat of such liability would deter an official's willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by
44. See Billings v. Worcester, 102 Mass. 329, 332-33 (1869) (under statute
which specifically created the duty, a town was held liable for injuries resulting
from defects in highways regardless of whether the town "exercised reasonable
care, or even the utmost diligence to make it very safe, if they are in fact not so");
Horton v. Ipswich, 66 Mass. 488, 491 (1853) (same); Town Council of Akron v.
McComb, 18 Ohio 229 (1849) (although officials were free from negligence and
malice, the municipal corporation was held liable to property owner when grading
on the street in front of his property diminished the value of his property); Lee v.
Sandy Hill, 40 N.Y. 442, 451 (1869) (because a city was under a duty to open a
particular street, the city was held liable for damages produced by the streetopening); Hurley v. Town of Texas, 20 Wis. 634 (1866) (liability for error in tax
collecting); Hawks v. Charlemont, 107 Mass. 414 (1871) (city removed materials
from plaintiff's property to effect repairs to a bridge); Squiers v. Village of Neenah, 24 Wis. 588, 593 (1869) (village was liable where trustees, acting on their
good faith belief that the landowner had given his consent, opened a road over his
property which resulted in a trespass). While the dissent contended that seven of
the eight "reiterating" cases "involved thoroughly unremarkable exceptions to
, 100
municipal immunity, as provided by state or common law", - U.S. at S. Ct. at 1430 n.19, the dissent failed to produce any authority which clearly
adopted an immunity predicated on the good faith acts of municipal officials.
45. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (allowed recovery for attorney's
fees from public funds instead of holding officials personally liable since there was
no bad faith on their part); Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979) (upheld absolute immunity for individual members of
regional planning agency, but suggested that if the agency had enacted unconstitutional legislation, the governmental entity itself should bear the liability).
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the public good;"'

and 3) the fear that the risk of personal liability may keep qualified citizens from seeking public office.4
The primary risk of injustice is not to the local governmental
entity, but to the citizen who either cannot show that a particular
official caused the violation or is met with a good faith defense by
the errant official. To prevent injustice to the citizen who suffers a
constitutional deprivation due to the good faith acts of one or more
officials, liability must be placed upon the governmental entity,
concluded the Court. This policy will also promote internal rules to
protect against "systemic" violations not attributable to a single

individual official.

In addition, the majority recognized principles

of equitable cost-spreading as a legitimate policy consideration.4 9
According to the majority, Owen, along with the existing body of

law concerning section 1983, properly allocated the risks and losses
among the three parties involved. The innocent victim will receive

compensation for his injuries. The official will be made to pay
damages when he acts in bad faith, the vigor with which he pursues his job not being diminished. Finally, the local government
shall be held liable only when its official policy or custom causes

the violation.

The majority found that the threat of municipal liability
would not have the same effect on an official's discretion as would
46. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 240 (1974).
47. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 320 (1975).
48. - U.S. at 49. See generally 3

, 100 S. Ct. at 1416.

K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE

§ 25.17 (1958

and Supp. 1970); PROSSER, TORTS § 131 at 978 (4th ed. 1971); Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Some Thoughts on the Ethical Formation of "Just
Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165 (1967) (cited by majority, Id., at
1417-18). The dissent, however, argued that placing financial responsibility on local governments may subject municipalities to potentially ruinous judgments.
U.S. at -,
100 S. Ct. at 1425. Accord, City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507, 517-20 (1973); but see Moore v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 708 (1973).
The dissent also contended that the Forty-Second Congress' rejection of the Sherman Amendment's version of strict liability was evidence that the strict liability
(dissent's categorization) which the majority imposed was not intended by the
framers of section 1983. The Sherman Amendment, an amendment to the bill
which became the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, proposed a curious type of
strict liability which proposed to hold municipalities liable for the wrongs of private citizens. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57. The Court in Monell admitted that
rejection of this anomalous form of strict liability does not conclusively establish
that the Forty-Second Congress opposed all forms of strict liability for municipalities. Id.
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personal liability. In support of this proposition, the majority made
several observations. Section 1983 violations are appropriately categorized with other decisions involving exposure of public funds.
This is a problem with which public officials are routinely faced.
The threat of municipal liability, instead of diminishing the vigor
and decisiveness with which a public official performs his duties,
would have a general beneficial effect, i.e., broader protection of an
individual's constitutional rights. 0 Public officials, aware of the
municipality's exposure to liability regardless of their good faith
acts, should thus be motivated to err in favor of the protection of
an individual's constitutional rights.8 1
The Owen Court's denial of a "good faith" immunity conclusively answers one of the major questions left unresolved by Monell. Three other significant issues were left open in Monell as
well: 1) What constitutes official policy and who are the official
policy makers? 2) What is the scope of "custom and usage"? and
3) What level of conduct is necessary on the part of a municipal
defendant to trigger a section 1983 violation? While Owen is silent
on the first two questions," some progress was made toward a resolution of the question of the level of conduct required for a section 1983 violation.
Owen appears to rule out intent as the requisite standard of
conduct in a section 1983 action. In Owen, individual city officials
did not intend to commit a constitutional violation. In fact, they
sought guidance on the matter from the city attorney. The city attorney advised the officials that their conduct was lawful.53 Armed
, 100 S. Ct. at 1416.
50. - U.S at
51. The dissent, however, contends that entity liability will have much the
same effect on officials as personal liability; "the resulting degree of governmental
paralysis will be little different from that caused by fear of personal liability."
- U.S. at __, Id. at 1425.
52. Commentators, however, have drawn some conclusions. Policy makers are
those who have final authority over a decision, or those to whom authority is
clearly delegated. Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monett, 79 COLUM. L.
Rav. 213, 217-23 (1979) [hereinafter Schnapper]. A statute unconstitutional on its
face is obviously an example of official policy which violates section 1983. A local
government, however, is not free from liability merely by adopting a statute which
is constitutionally neutral on its face. Official tolerance of an unconstitutional application of an otherwise constitutionally valid official policy will also trigger a
section 1983 violation. This would be an example of a "custom or usage." See
Note, Municipal Liability Under Section 1983: The Meaning of "Policy or Custom", 79 COLUM. L. Rav. 304, 305 (1979); Schnapper, supra, at 215-34.
53. 421 F. Supp. at 1118.
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with this advice, the city officials had no reason to anticipate that
the conduct surrounding Owen's discharge would be adjudged unconstitutional. Knowledge, therefore, must also be eliminated as a
necessary element in a section 1983 prima facie case. The requisite
level of conduct must therefore be either some form of negligence
or strict liability, excluding a pure respondeat superior theory
which was rejected in Monett."
At the time Owen was discharged, the prevailing test for deprivation of a liberty interest under the Supreme Court's decision in
Wisconsin v. Constantineau" was "where a person's good name,
reputation, honor or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential."' 6 The position might be advanced that Owen's discharge could reasonably be construed as coming within the Constantineau test. The Owen decision may therefore support a negligence standard. The majority, however, did not concern itself with
the foreseeability of the violation, but rather determined the city's
liability based on the prevailing standards at the time the case was
decided.57 This indicates, as the dissent concluded,58 that the standard imposed by the Owen majority is one of strict liability.
AN EVOLVING TREND

Owen is illustrative of a continuing trend which first emerged
in Monett. Even before Monell, however, commentators criticized
the Monroe holding (that local governments were not "persons"
amenable to suit under section 1983)19 as well as devised methods
for circumventing its restrictiveness." In Monett, the Court re54. 436 U.S. at 691.

55. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
56. Id. at 437.

57. The city officials could not have predicted the holding of Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972), which was decided aproximately two
months after Owen's discharge. In Roth, the Court held that discharge of an employee simultaneous with a "charge against him that might seriously damage his
standing and associations in his community" would qualify as something "the
government is doing to him", under Wisconsin v. Constantineau.
58. U.S. at , 100 S. Ct. at 1423.

59. See Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of

the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 131, 132-36 (1972); Note, Developing

Governmental Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1201, 1205-09
(1971).

60. Blum, From Monroe to Monell: Defining the Scope of Municipal Liability in Federal Courts, 51 TeMP. L.Q. 409, 412 (1978); Note, Damage Remedies

[1980:1411

MUNICIPAL LIABILITY

versed its position taken in Monroe and held that municipalities
are "persons" within the meaning of section 1983. The Monell
Court reevaluated the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871," and found that Monroe had
misconstrued the meaning of the section."' The denial of a qualified immunity to local governments in Owen continues the Monell
trend by increasing an individual plaintiff's opportunity for redress
of a section 1983 violation. Owen extends the protection of section
1983 to situations where the violation is "systemic" and not the
result of a single official's conduct and to cases where the violation
is caused by one or more officials acting in good faith.
Two cases decided after Owen further expand the availability
of section 1983 actions to citizens who are harmed by conduct or
official involvement of a local government. The Supreme Court, in
Gomez v. Toledo," held that the good faith of a government official must be pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense by the
defendant. Plaintiff need only prove 1) that a person deprived him
of a federal right, and 2) that such deprivation occurred while that
person was acting under color of state law.' In Maine v.
Thiboutot,s 5 the Court allowed an individual to challenge the deprivation of welfare benefits guaranteed by the Federal Social Security Act in a section 1983 action. The novelty of this approach is
that previously, the language "secured by the Constitution and
laws" had been construed to include only federal statutes which
provide for equal rights of persons. Because of the Thiboutot decision, federal rights other than those of a civil rights nature may
now be vindicated under section 1983." Although the majority's
support for section 1983 beyond civil rights cases in Thiboutot is
Against Municipalities for ConstitutionalViolations, 89 HARV. L. REv. 922, 92535 (1976). The most prominent was an action arising directly under the fourteenth amendment using 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), general federal question jurisdiction. See note 15 supra.
61. 436 U.S. at 664-90.
62. Id. at 700.
63.
- U.S.
,
. Ct.
64 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1980).
- U.S. -,
S. Ct. -,
Id. at 577.
64.
65. U.S. -,
100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
66. This will, however, produce section 1983 actions for which the federal
courts may not obtain jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3), which provides federal jurisdiction for rights "secured by the Constitution of the United States or by
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens." For these actions, the ju-

risdictional amount of $10,000 must be met under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general
federal question statute.
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not particularly persuasive, both Gomez and Thiboutot are
further
evidence that the scope of section 1983 is being rapidly expanded.
CONCLUSION

The Court in Owen concluded that both congressional intent
and public policy considerations support holding municipalities
liable in section 1983 actions despite the good faith acts of
their officials. Owen also resolved some of the questions left open
in Monell. Owen, however, is most notable as a significant development
in a rapidly evolving trend, albeit only recently set by the
Court, of
employing section 1983 as a vehicle for increasing citizens'
access
to the federal courts when in pursuit of municipal defendants.
RONALD
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